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Cross-cultural regularities in the cognitive architecture of pride 
 
ABSTRACT  
Pride occurs in every known culture, appears early in development, is reliably triggered by 
achievements and formidability, and causes a characteristic display that is recognized 
everywhere. Here we evaluate the theory that pride evolved to guide decisions relevant to 
pursuing actions that enhance valuation and respect for a person in the minds of others. By 
hypothesis, pride is a neurocomputational program tailored by selection to orchestrate cognition 
and behavior in the service of: (i) motivating the cost-effective pursuit of courses of action that 
would increase others’ valuations and respect of the individual, (ii) motivating the advertisement 
of acts or characteristics whose recognition by others would lead them to enhance their 
evaluations of the individual, and (iii) mobilizing the individual to take advantage of the 
resulting enhanced social landscape. To modulate how much to invest in actions that might lead 
to enhanced evaluations by others, the pride system must forecast the magnitude of the 
evaluations the action would evoke in the audience and calibrate its activation proportionally. 
We tested this prediction in 16 countries across 4 continents (n = 2085), for 25 acts and traits. As 
predicted, the pride intensity for a given act or trait closely tracks the valuations of audiences, 
local (mean r = +.82) and foreign (mean r = +.75). This relationship is specific to pride, and does 
not generalize to other positive emotions that co-activate with pride but lack its audience-
recalibrating function.  
  
Significance 
Cross-cultural tests from 16 nations were performed to evaluate the hypothesis that the emotion 
of pride evolved to guide behavior to elicit valuation and respect from others. Ancestrally, this 
would have led to increased assistance and deference from others. To incline choice, the pride 
system must compute for a potential action an anticipated pride intensity that tracks the 
magnitude of the approval or respect that the action would generate in the local audience. All 
tests demonstrated that pride intensities measured in each location closely track the magnitudes 
of others’ positive evaluations. Moreover, different cultures echo each other both in what causes 
pride and in what elicits positive evaluations, suggesting that the underlying valuation systems 
are universal. 
 
\body  
Introduction: The role of welfare tradeoffs in human evolution 
Our hominin ancestors evolved in a harsh and challenging world characterized by high rates 
of mortality, high variance in food acquisition (1), a high incidence of disease and injury (2), and 
attacks by humans and non-humans (3). Modern conditions that buffer such risks (e.g., stored 
food, police) were absent, and to a zoologically unusual degree our ancestors relied on the other 
members of the groups they lived in for the assistance necessary for survival and reproduction. 
For example, provisioning the injured with food—typical among humans—is entirely lacking in 
nonhuman primates, who starve when incapacitated instead. In humans, natural selection 
strongly favored the evolution of adaptations in individuals to induce others to help them. 
In general, there are two families of social tools organisms have available for influencing 
others’ choices: First, they can conditionally inflict costs—aggression; and second, they can 
bestow (or withhold) benefits—altruism. The first causes individuals to be respected (or feared). 
The second causes individuals to be valued. It might be advantageous to put weight on another’s 
welfare (i) because the individual is formidable and could inflict costs if not propitiated; or (ii) 
because the individual’s actions or existence make positive fitness contributions to the valuer, 
which would be degraded or lost if assistance was not given. For convenience, here we call these 
two components respect (for formidability), and valuation (for positive fitness contributions). 
Being respected or favorably valued by others were resources, and selection on our ancestors 
would have shaped human social emotions to promote access to these resources. More precisely, 
our ancestors’ survival and reproduction sensitively depended on the extent to which other group 
members placed weight on their welfare in making decisions—that is, the degree to which others 
traded off or sacrificed their own welfare for the welfare of the recipient (e.g., to keep food for 
oneself, or share it with one or more specific persons).  
Because nonhumans are far more limited in the kinds of assistance they can render each 
other, almost all nonhuman negotiation is based on aggression. Differences in the ability to 
inflict costs (formidability or resource holding power) led to adaptations for the advertisement of 
formidability, and adaptations for assessing own and others’ formidability (4). In group-living 
species, dominance hierarchies emerge from patterns of prudent deference to those with more 
formidability—individuals cede resources or rank to avoid being harmed (5).  
Although humans retain and exploit phylogenetically ancient adaptations for aggression and 
dominance (including systems for threat, fighting, display, and assessment) (4–7), human 
evolution was distinctive in the greatly expanded role that mutual assistance played in daily 
group living, and hence in the reproductive fortunes of individuals (7, 8). The hominin entry into 
the cognitive niche (involving the emergence and integration of intelligence, language, tool use, 
coordination, and culture) greatly amplified the opportunities for mutually advantageous 
prosocial interactions (9, 10). As our ancestors entered the cognitive niche and became hunter-
gatherers, there would have been novel and intense selection for adaptations designed to make 
the self valuable to others, and hence recruit assistance from others. We hypothesize that the 
emotion of pride functions as an evolved guidance system that modulates behavior in order to 
cost-effectively manage and capitalize on the propensities of others to value or respect the actor.  
For behavior to succeed in making the self more valuable to or respected by others, others 
must have neural programs to value and trade off welfare in favor of conspecifics. The properties 
of these programs in the minds of others constitute the task environment which the pride system 
evolved to exploit. Indeed, over the last half-century, evolutionary biologists have developed 
theories of how a number of different selection pressures favor the evolution of mechanisms 
designed to value the welfare of others, and to (within limits) sacrifice self for others. These 
theories include kin selection (11); reciprocation (12, 13); reputation (14–16); risk-pooling (1, 
17, 18); externality management (19); and (substituting deference for valuation) the asymmetric 
war of attrition (20). These theories in aggregate require the existence of an evolved, human-
universal neurocognitive architecture for computing the social value of others to oneself, and 
vice versa—an architecture that governs the extent to which the self will trade off his or her 
welfare in favor of others’ welfare (21–23). Moreover, these theories led to the empirical 
discovery of an array of specialized choice architectures that implement welfare-tradeoff 
decisions given the information available to the actor about an interaction partner (e.g. how to 
respond to cues of the recipient’s relatedness, skills, generosity, attractiveness, ability to defend 
her interests, etc. (6, 24–28)). Each specific theory provides contentful predictions about the 
dimensions of the psychology of valuation in our species that the pride system targets (e.g., 
productivity, generosity, bravery, strength, health, attractiveness). 
 
The advertisement-recalibration theory of pride 
According to what we will call the advertisement–recalibration theory of pride, pride is an 
evolved human-universal neurocomputational program that was designed by natural selection to 
orchestrate cognition, physiology, and behavior in the service of: (i) motivating the individual to 
choose courses of action or the acquisition of traits where the prospective benefits of increased 
valuation and respect exceed the costs, (ii) advertising positive information about the self so that 
it reaches others more reliably, and (iii) capitalizing on the benefits of increased valuation and 
respect in others (see also 5, 7, 29, 30). Dynamically, others’ assessments of the acts and 
characteristics of an individual lead them to value (or devalue) her. When others (an audience) 
detect new information about an individual that is at odds with their current level of valuation, 
they recalibrate the value assigned to that person either upward or downward, with 
correspondingly positive or negative effects on their dispositions to aid or defer to that 
individual. This, in turn, would have selected for the motivational subcomponents of the pride 
system. First, pride should be designed to anticipate how an audience would modify its 
evaluation in response to an action, and should make more value- or deference-promoting actions 
feel more rewarding and more attractive in prospect. This helps the choice system determine 
which achievements are worth the effort. This planning stage is one component in which pride as 
a feeling is experienced, so higher-paying courses of action are chosen over lower-paying ones. 
Second, pride should be designed to facilitate the transfer of favorable information to the 
relevant audience, so they can recalibrate valuation and respect upward. Third, when others 
register one’s achievements or dominance and recalibrate upwards, the individual needs to 
recalibrate her own model of how much others now value her (31) and her “entitlement” to 
favorable treatment (6). This representation of the degree of welfare tradeoffs the individual is 
entitled to modulates how the individual will capitalize on others’ revised valuations. This is 
another stage where feeling pride happens: One cannot, for example, choose to be the child of 
someone important, but it is adaptive for the person to recognize the way this increases how 
others value them. Assimilating this heightened valuation or deference allows individuals to 
pursue social opportunities previously beyond reach (7, 30, 29), or to press for better treatment 
from others (32). 
Computationally, the underlying social valuation system needs a database of values matched 
to actions (e.g., gives food) and traits (e.g., daughter of headman) that can be accessed by the 
pride system and the system that values individuals. Entries in this database could be culturally 
acquired, but given the endless number of potential acts, it is likely that various species-typical 
adaptations involving social valuation (the mating system; the formidability assessment system; 
the social exchange system; etc.) can inferentially generate probable values even in the absence 
of prior exposure to local valuation. This would predict commonalities from culture to culture in 
what makes humans proud, and what makes them value others.  
Existing findings on pride are consistent with the advertisement–recalibration theory. Pride-
driven choices and pride displays occur in every known culture (33), and appear reliably and 
early in development (34–36). Pride is triggered by achievements (35, 37), aggressive 
formidability (38, see 39), and other factors of social value such as attractiveness and 
membership in a powerful coalition (40). The feeling of pride is highly pleasurable (41). This 
internal reward can motivate people to undertake and persevere at costly but socially valued 
courses of action (42–44). Pride has a full-body display featuring an erect and expanded posture, 
with gaze directed at the audience, and bodily relaxation (5, 34, 45). This display conveys 
achievement and dominance (5, 7, 46), and reflects both short-term and long-term successes (37, 
47); thus, the pride display is attractive to potential mates (48), a cue to choose partners, and 
intimidating to rivals (5, 49), which may have the effect of reducing aggression (20) and 
stabilizing a dominance hierarchy. The behavioral display of pride, which derives from 
dominance and deference systems, is zoologically widespread, not only among non-human 
primates (50) but in a wide range of taxa, including invertebrates (51); thus, it is phylogenetically 
ancient (for similarities and differences between human and non-human status, see 5, 7, 39). 
The pride display appears to generate common knowledge of enhanced value (52), is 
produced even by congenitally blind individuals (38), and is recognizable by young children (53) 
and by adults within and across cultures (45, 54). Cultural differences in pride exist (41, 55–57). 
However, theoretical considerations (58) and empirical data (59, 60, see 61) suggest that these 
differences result from (for example) differences in what audiences value in others (i.e. the 
weights attached to the inputs of the pride mechanism) rather than differences in the cognitive 
architecture of pride. Indeed, cross-cultural evidence has recently provided support for the 
hypothesis that the complementary emotion of shame is an adaptation that evolved to deter 
actions where the costs of devaluation by others exceed the benefits, to prevent audiences from 
receiving negative information about the individual that would lead to devaluation, and to buffer 
against devaluation if the negative information does spread (22). Pride serves analogous 
functions with respect to positive information that leads to enhanced valuation or respect. We 
note that human pride, and its obverse shame, are evolutionarily derived from regulatory systems 
for dominance and submission (5, 7, 8), and various aspects of those emotions (e.g. the displays) 
are homologous to those of simians (5). For example, receiving a pride display may elicit 
submission, while receiving a shame display terminates aggression; thus, these conjugated 
systems reduce overt conflict and further attacks (5, 62; for a non-human example, see 63). 
The decision-making architecture of a social organism should evaluate and integrate two 
kinds of payoffs to regulate behavior adaptively: (i) the direct payoff of the potential action (e.g., 
the value of foraging for a food item), and (ii) the social valuation payoff (e.g., showing 
bandmates that one is a skilled forager (64)). According to the advertisement–recalibration 
theory, the anticipated feeling of pride is the read-out of the estimated social valuation payoff, 
which must be added to the direct payoff to get the full value of a candidate course of action. 
(Given its role in planning, this feeling may occur even in the absence of an audience). For the 
organism to adaptively modulate how much effort and risk to invest in actions whose benefits lie 
in the changed evaluations of others, the pride system must forecast the magnitude of the 
evaluations the action would evoke in the audience, and calibrate its activation proportionally. 
The under-activation of pride leads to maladaptive choices where (i) the acts with high social 
payoffs are insufficiently pursued, (ii) achievements or desirable traits are insufficiently 
advertised and hence trigger less upward valuation recalibration in the audience, and (iii) the 
individual does not take advantage of the extent to which others value her. Conversely, an over-
activation of pride yields diminishing or even negative returns, as beneficial courses of action are 
over-pursued, and moreover, audiences’ evaluations become less favorable to the individual, as 
others are designed to resist and devalue excessive advertisement and entitled actions that exceed 
the individual’s actual social value (65, 66, see 67). (Given the self-interest bias, some 
opportunistic status over-claiming may be expected (68), although repeated interactions in 
naturalistic contexts will constrain this.) To balance these competing demands, pride should 
deploy in lockstep with the valuation that is prevalent in audiences drawn from the individual’s 
(local) social ecology. Indeed, because decisions about actions must be made in advance of 
observing feedback about one’s actions, pride feelings should forecast, and track in intensity, the 
magnitude of others’ evaluative recalibrations for a given act or trait (22). We test this basic 
design feature in 16 countries across 4 continents. 
 
Study 1 
To test the prediction that the intensity of felt pride tracks the valuations of local audiences, we 
recruited 1,458 participants from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Turkey, Israel, India, Singapore, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Inattentive participants were excluded from analyses, leaving 
a total effective sample of 1,348 (Study 1a–p). We created 25 scenarios in which someone’s acts, 
traits, or circumstances might lead them to be viewed positively. The scenarios were designed to 
elicit reactions in a wide range of evolutionarily relevant domains, such as social exchange, 
skills, aggressive contests, mating, parenting, and leadership. 
Participants completed one of two between-subjects conditions: an audience condition and a 
pride condition. Participants in the audience condition were asked to provide their reactions to 25 
scenarios involving a third-party: an individual other than themselves who is of the same sex and 
age as the participant (e.g., “She is trustworthy,” “She has many unique skills,” “She is 
physically attractive”). Participants in the audience condition were asked to “indicate how you 
would view [someone of your same sex and age] if they were in those situations,” using scales 
ranging from 1 (I wouldn’t view them positively at all) to 7 (I’d view them very positively). 
These ratings provide a measure of the degree to which members of a given population would 
value the individual described in the scenarios. 
In the pride condition, a different set of participants was asked to “indicate how much pride 
you would feel if you were in those situations” (i.e. in each of the 25 scenarios; e.g., “You are 
trustworthy,” “You have many unique skills,” “You are physically attractive”), with scales 
ranging from 1 (no pride at all) to 7 (a lot of pride). The stimuli in the audience and pride 
conditions were identical on a scenario-by-scenario basis, the only difference being the 
perspective from which the events are described.  
If, as argued above, a human-universal grammar of social value exists, then this raises the 
expectation—in contrast to traditional anthropological expectation—that many things that are 
viewed as socially valuable, and hence pride-eliciting, will be shared across cultures rather than 
unique to each culture. If pride is an adaptation for recalibrating the valuations of local 
audiences, and some values are universally held (i.e. by local and foreign audiences), then the 
intensity of pride these scenarios elicit in a given country should track the degree of valuation 
they elicit in the other countries. 
 
Within-country results. First, we report the valuation and pride results for each country. Full 
text of the scenarios and descriptive statistics are provided in SI Appendix, Tables S2a–S2p.  
There is widespread agreement on how valuation-enhancing these situations are relative to 
one another: Mean intra-class correlation across the 16 countries: ICC(2,n) = .95 (SI Appendix, 
Table S3). Participants agree also about the extent to which they would feel pride in these 
situations: Mean ICC(2,n) = .92 (SI Appendix, Table S3). To test the main prediction that pride 
tracks audience valuation, we calculated, for each scenario, the mean pride ratings provided by 
participants in the pride condition, and the mean valuation ratings provided by participants in the 
audience condition. Pride and valuation means are highly correlated with one another within 
each country, with a mean r = .82 (SD = .05; min. r = .72; max. r = .90; N rs = 16); Ps = 10-9 – 
10-4 (Fig. 1; Table S4, diagonal values). Scenario # 11 (pride condition: “You get into a fight in 
front of everybody, and you completely dominate your opponent with punch after punch, until 
your opponent is knocked out”) is a low outlier in various samples—perhaps because these 
samples come from pacified populations (69). Excluding this scenario from analysis does not 
substantially change the pride–valuation correlations, however: mean r = .77 (SD = .09; min. r = 
.55; max. r = .88; N rs = 16); Ps = 10-7 – .005. All reported correlations remain significant after 
applying a False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction (70) of P < .05, unless otherwise noted. Recall 
that the pride and valuation ratings originate from different sets of participants. Consequently, 
these high correlations cannot be attributed to participants matching their pride and valuation 
ratings. 
 
Between-country results. Some actions, traits, and situations elicit valuation in some cultures 
but not others (64, 71). But if the machinery for computing the social value of others is species-
typical, then there will be situations that provoke valuation, and elicit pride, across cultures (33, 
41). To test for between-country agreement in valuation, in pride, and in the pride–valuation link, 
we computed the extent to which the mean valuation ratings and the mean pride ratings are 
correlated across countries. Supporting the hypothesis of a species-wide grammar of social value, 
there is a high degree of between-country agreement on the extent to which a given situation 
would elicit positive valuation: mean r = .90 (SD = .06; min. r = .73; max. r = .98; N rs = 120); 
Ps = 10-17 – 10-4 (SI Appendix, Table S5). There is also high between-country agreement on the 
extent to which a given situation would elicit pride: mean r = .81 (SD = .11; min. r = .51; max. r 
= .97; N rs = 120); Ps = 10-14 – .009 (SI Appendix, Table S6). And, as predicted, the pride 
elicited in each of the 16 countries is positively correlated with the valuations from the other 15 
countries: mean r = .75 (SD = .09; min. r = .48; max. r = .93; N rs = 240); Ps = 10-10 – .017 
(Table S4, off-diagonal values). Note that the proportion of variance in pride accounted for by 
the valuations of foreign audiences (mean = 56%) is close to that accounted for by the valuations 
of local audiences (mean = 67%). Excluding scenario # 11 from analysis does not substantially 
alter the between-country pride–valuation correlations: mean r = .69 (SD = .13; min. r = .29; 
max. r = .90; N rs = 240); Ps = 10-8 – .17; 222 of these 240 correlations (92.5% of them) remain 
significant at FDR P < .05.  
 
Study 2 
If it is pride in particular that aims to recalibrate audiences, then audience valuation should be 
tracked more closely by pride than by other emotions that are positive and arousing (as pride is), 
but not designed for recalibrating audiences. To evaluate this prediction, we conducted a follow-
up study in the United States and India (Study 2a–b, n = 361). There were five between-subjects 
conditions: one audience condition assessing valuation, and four emotion conditions: pride, 
excitement, amusement, and happiness. Excitement, amusement, and happiness were chosen 
because these three emotions often co-activate with pride, and they are positive and arousing, 
like pride is (41, 72–74). 
The scenarios, as well as the descriptive statistics for each scenario and each country, are 
provided in SI appendix, Tables S7a−S7b. 
Pride tracked audience valuation, and it did so better than amusement, excitement, and 
happiness did. The extent to which a scenario would elicit valuation in an audience positively 
predicted the intensity of pride participants would feel when imagining themselves in that 
scenario, r(23) = .77, p = 10-5 (India); r(23) = .81, p = 10-6 (US). Valuation and amusement 
correlated in India (r(23) = .58, p = .003), but not in the US (r(23) = .02, p = .92). Valuation and 
excitement correlated marginally in India (r(23) = .36, p = .07), but did not correlate in the US 
(r(23) = .14, p = .51). Valuation and happiness correlated in India (r(23) = .76, p = 10-5) and the 
US (r(23) = .72, p = 10-4). We note that pride correlated with excitement (US: r(23) = .47, p = 
.018; India: r(23) = .66, p = .0003), with happiness (US: r(23) = .88, p = 10-8; India: r(23) = .77, 
p = 10-5), and with amusement (in India r(23) = .66, p = .0003, though not in the US: r(23) = .19, 
p = .36). Recall that the valuation, pride, amusement, excitement, and happiness ratings 
originated from different participants.  
To more clearly assess the associations between the emotions and valuation, we regressed 
valuation simultaneously on pride, amusement, excitement, and happiness. Pride continued to 
predict valuation even after controlling for the other three emotions (β = .59, p = .004 (IN); β = 
.86, p = .007 (US)). Amusement did not display unique associations with valuation (β = .07, p = 
.72 (IN); β = .04, p = .84 (US)). Excitement negatively predicted valuation (significantly in India 
(β = −.47, p = .012), and marginally in the US (β = −.35, p = .06)). Happiness uniquely and 
positively predicted valuation after controlling for the other three emotions; in India (β = .57, p = 
.015), but not in the US (β = .12, p = .68). Given the inter-correlations between our predictor 
variables, we examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with each predictor to 
assess potential multicollinearity. All VIFs for both analyses were less than 6.6, and thus did not 
exceed the commonly accepted maximum of 10 (75).  
In sum, the match between audience valuation and pride is specific; it does not generalize to 
amusement, excitement, or happiness, even when the latter co-activate with pride.  
If pride recalibrates audience valuation to augment one’s welfare, and fitness, then pride 
should be tuned specifically to the valuations of those who, upon receiving information 
revelatory of gains in one’s social value or formidability, would impact one’s welfare—local 
audiences. Pride will track the valuations of foreign audiences, but only to the extent that foreign 
and local audiences agree in their valuations. When they disagree, the relationship between pride 
and foreign valuation should dissolve. To test this prediction, we conducted a follow-up study in 
the United States and India using scenarios constructed to elicit (a) similar levels of pride in the 
United States and India, (b) more pride in the United States, or (c) more pride in India—the latter 
two types of scenarios were based on an anthropological report (76) and advice from bicultural 
informants (SI Appendix, Study S1 and Tables S8–S9; n = 266). As predicted, pride tracked the 
valuation of foreign audiences when the valuations of foreign and local audiences were 
correlated, but it failed to track foreign audiences for scenarios that led to different evaluations in 
the United States and India. 
 
Discussion 
These findings support the hypothesis that pride is an adaptation for cost-effectively promoting 
increases in others’ valuations or respect for the individual. In particular, we showed that pride in 
the individual closely tracks the valuations of audiences in the individual’s social ecology. 
Further, pride is specific to audience valuation: Emotions that co-activate with pride, such as 
happiness and excitement, do not track audience valuation uniquely and reliably. This suggests 
that pride, rather than other positive emotions, is distinctively involved in social valuation. 
Further evidence to demonstrate domain-specificity is needed, however.  
The intensity of pride in prospect tracks audience evaluations even though those ratings 
originate from different sets of individuals. For pride to track evaluations, the pride system must 
possess accurate information about the degree to which the local audience will evaluate 
individuals as a function of their acts or traits. Considerations of parsimony suggest that both are 
informed by a common underlying architecture of social valuation. 
The cross-cultural agreement on pride, valuation, and their interrelationship is noteworthy. 
Non-evolutionary views conceptualize cultures as being richly different from each other (77). If 
this were true, then what cultures value and what makes members of different cultures proud 
should be substantially different. Indeed, pride has been argued to heavily rely on culture-
specific schemas (55, 57, 78). One application of this argument is that in collectivist cultures 
such as Japan, where the self is construed as an interdependent entity, people do not strive to 
maintain a positive view of the self; they do not “self-enhance” (79). Instead, people strive to be 
modest, save face, and improve themselves (80) in order to harmoniously fit in the collective 
(81). Consistent with this, Japan has the third-lowest pride grand mean and the lowest valuation 
grand mean—although we note that ratings of pride and valuation may not be directly 
comparable across countries (79). Yet, the relative pride elicited by the 25 scenarios among the 
Japanese, and in the other collectivist samples, substantially tracked how positively people in 
other countries would view individuals in those scenarios, whether those countries were 
individualist or collectivist (e.g., the United States vs. South Korea (82)). This is unlikely if 
people in East-Asian or collectivist cultures truly lack self-enhancement (83). However, if (a) 
pride is a human-universal adaptation designed to increase the valuation or respect conferred by 
members of one’s local social ecology, and (b) there is a species-wide architecture of social 
valuation, drawing on a species-typical array of evaluative adaptations for mating, social 
exchange, skills, and so on, then there ought to be robust similarities from culture to culture in 
pride, valuation, and their relationship. This view explains not only the high degree of within-
culture consistency but also the between-culture consistency that we predicted and found.  
The present data cannot rule out the possibility that elements of shared cultural phylogeny 
(e.g., exposure to a global culture) or convergent evolution in transmitted culture (84) led to 
these cross-cultural consistencies. Data from a larger set of more distantly related cultures may 
resolve this issue. Further research may also profitably assess the various routes to achieving 
valuation and respect, the developmental trajectory of pride, sex differences in pride, the cultural 
distribution of the displays of dominance and submission, and the complementariness of pride 
and shame.  
The current results help to locate pride within a functionally interlinked architecture of 
social emotions that also includes shame, anger, and gratitude. Although each of these emotions 
has different hypothesized evolved functions, they all depend on an underlying evolved welfare-
tradeoff psychology (21). Briefly, under the welfare-tradeoff framework (85, 86), the function of 
shame is to limit information-triggered reductions in the weight placed on one’s welfare by 
others; the function of anger is to incentivize others to place a higher weight on one’s welfare 
when that weight is deemed insufficiently low; the function of gratitude is to consolidate a higher 
level of cooperation when the system detects that an unexpectedly high weight has been put on 
one’s welfare; the function of pride, as argued above, is to motivate the individual to both 
achieve and advertise traits or acts so that others place a higher weight on his or her welfare.  
People dislike the social subordination that sometimes follows others’ increases in status, 
and in rivalrous zero-sum settings the mere success of others is experienced as a grievance (87, 
88). Occasionally, pride over-activates and causes an excessive sense of entitlement. Perhaps for 
these reasons, pride has long been deemed potentially problematic, even a sin (30). However, an 
evolutionary–functional analysis suggests a different view: This emotion is the expression of an 
evolved system that promotes the pursuit of socially valued courses of action and facilitates the 
gains in valuation that make those actions worth pursuing. 
 
Methods 
The study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Boards at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara, the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Griffith University, 
Singapore Management University, and the Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University; 
the Research Ethics Committee, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen; 
the Departmental Research Ethics Committee, Anthropology, University of Oxford; and the 
Ethics board, Bilkent University. All the participants completed electronic informed consents. 
 
Study 1 
Samples for Study 1. We collected data from 1,458 participants in the United States (US, Study 
1a), Canada (CA, 1b), the United Kingdom (GB, 1c), France (FR, 1d), Belgium (BE, 1e), the 
Netherlands (NL, 1f), Switzerland (CH, 1g), Italy (IT, 1h), Turkey (TR, 1i), Israel (IL, 1j), India 
(IN, 1k), Singapore (SG, 1l), the Philippines (PH, 1m), South Korea (KR, 1n), Japan (JP, 1o), 
and Australia (AU, 1p). The numbers of participants are: 120 (US), 29 (CA), 86 (GB), 168 (FR), 
89 (BE), 60 (NL), 59 (CH), 47 (IT), 131 (TR), 105 (IL), 120 (IN), 135 (SG), 39 (PH), 37 (KR), 
200 (JP), 33 (AU). On average, 6% of each sample was excluded from analyses due to failure to 
correctly respond to an attention check. One Italian participant may have taken the study twice; 
removing that presumptive data leaves the results virtually unchanged. Participants were 
recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) or other survey companies (US, CA, GB, IN, PH, 
JP), subject pool announcement and other types of communications to students (FR, BE, NL, IT, 
IL, SG, AU), and social networks (NL, CH, TR, KR). For demographic information and 
effective sample sizes, see SI Appendix, Table S1.  
Measures. The 25 scenarios are shown in SI Appendix, Tables S2a–S2p. Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the audience condition or the pride condition. Participants indicated 
their sex at the outset and the scenarios were sexed appropriately. The order in which the 
scenarios were presented was random across participants. The stimuli were presented in English 
(US, CA, GB, IN, SG, PH, AU), French (FR, CH), Dutch (BE, NL), Italian (IT), Turkish (TR), 
Hebrew (IL), Korean (KR), and Japanese (JP).  
 
Study 2 
Samples for Study 2. AMT was used to recruit 203 participants in the United States (Study 2a). 
One of them was removed from analyses due to failure to correctly respond to an attention 
check, leaving an effective sample size of 202 (120 females), with a mean age of 38 (SD = 13). 
AMT was used to recruit 158 participants in India (Study 2b). Eleven of them were removed 
from analyses due to failure to correctly respond to an attention check, leaving an effective 
sample size of 147 (50 females), with a mean age of 33 (SD = 9). 
Measures. Study 2a–b had five between-subjects conditions: one audience condition assessing 
valuation, and four emotion conditions: pride, amusement, excitement, and happiness. The 
scenarios were the same as in Study 1a–1p. The stimuli were presented in English in the United 
States and India. 
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Figure legend 
Fig. 1. Study 1a–p. Scatter plots: Pride as a function of valuation. Each point represents the mean 
valuation rating and mean pride rating of one scenario. Valuation and pride ratings were given by 
different participants. N = number of scenarios = 25. Effect size: R2 linear. a, United States; b, 
Canada; c, United Kingdom; d, France; e, Belgium; f, Netherlands; g, Switzerland; h, Italy; i, 
Turkey; j, Israel; k, India; l, Singapore; m, Philippines; n, South Korea; o, Japan; p, Australia. 
